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Abstract 
This paper uses a PVAR model to study the macroeconomic effects of trade disintegration 
among NAFTA members. The results reveal substantial asymmetric responses, showing that 
the US is the most affected economy from a sudden negative trade integration shock. 
Moreover, Canada and the US are found to be relatively more interconnected with each other 
compared to the Mexican economy. Our findings question the US decision to push for the 
renegotiation of the NAFTA agreement.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Regionalism has entered a new phase, with mega-regional trade negotiations suddenly 
collapsing and unexpected withdrawals from long-standing integration schemes. Deep 
divisions and turmoil over trade issues are epitomised in the uncertain future of the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), where President Trump recently called for a 
renegotiation of the deal. This environment has led to questions about the effects of a ‘break-
up’ shock. There are a number of notable examples of the collapse of large-scale and/or long-
standing integration schemes. Head et al. (2010) explore the trade dynamics of former colonies 
with their coloniser, within a gravity framework; while conceptually similar, Fidrmuc and 
Fidrmuc (2003) examine the trade effects of the collapse of the Soviet block. However, the 
literature is limited and not much is known about the effect of these negative shocks compared 
to trade integration. 
Methodologically, the analysis of unexpected shocks or surprises is typically 
undertaken within a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) modelling framework. This type 
of analysis is frequently applied, and the advantages are well understood, in the context of 
business cycles and the monetary transmission mechanism (Fève et al., 2018). On the other 
hand, research using SVAR modelling to consider the impact of shocks in a trade setting is still 
in its infancy. For example, Çakir and Kabundi (2013) investigate an export/import shock, 
Nordmeier et al. (2016) a trade liberalization shock, Du et al. (2017) a political relations shock, 
and, most recently, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2018) consider a terms of trade shock. Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2018) focus on a group of emerging and poor countries and find that terms 
of trade shocks have a more limited impact on key macroeconomic indicators, than one would 
expect from models with micro-foundations. The focus for Nordmeier et al. (2016) is somewhat 
different, where they explore the impact of a trade liberalisation shock on the German labour 
market; they find a positive effect broadly in line with the existing literature. Du et al. (2017) 
find that political shocks die out quickly, and therefore high-frequency data is required to 
identify the impact of such shocks on trade. The authors also find that gravity models use low 
frequency data, and in doing so fail to identify the impact of these shocks. Finally, Çakir and 
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Kabundi’s (2013) global VAR (GVAR) analysis allows the authors to identify trade linkages 
between South Africa and the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries.  
This paper provides a novel contribution to this emerging literature by exploring a 
trade disintegration shock within a PVAR framework; thereby allowing us to examine the 
effect of the shock on various macroeconomic indicators for the three members of NAFTA 
(Canada, Mexico and the US). The main advantage of PVARs over traditional SVAR models is 
the addition of the cross-sectional structure. Furthermore, PVARs can capture greater variety 
of potential interlinkages than GVARs (Pesaran et al., 2004), which impose a particular 
structure on the interdependencies. These are significant properties that allows us to assess 
and test the potential linkages and spillovers among the examined economies. In conducting 
this analysis, we provide a timely contribution to the literature considering the potential 
impact of the sudden collapse of the NAFTA agreement. Furthermore, we illustrate the 
usefulness of PVAR modelling to explore the responses to a trade disintegration shock for the 
NAFTA participants.  
Our empirical results show a significant degree of heterogeneity in terms of 
macroeconomic responses of the three NAFTA members, and reveal that the US economy is 
the most vulnerable to a negative trade integration shock. Furthermore, the US and Canadian 
economies are found to be more interlinked with each other as opposed to Mexico. These 
findings question the decision by the US administration for a renegotiation or full withdrawal 
from the NAFTA agreement.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the empirical 
methodology and the data. Section III discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section IV 
concludes. 
 
II. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Our model is built upon a panel vector autoregressive model (PVAR) framework, where the 
terminology that we use thereafter is based on Canova and Ciccarelli (2013). In general, PVAR 
models are increasingly becoming a popular tool for examining the interactions of several 
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entities. The main advantage over traditional structural VARs is the addition of a cross-
sectional structure. This is a significant property that allows us to assess and test the potential 
linkages and spillovers among the examined countries. Letting y 𝑖,𝑡 be a vector of G 
endogenous variables of country i (i=1,…,N) at time t (t=1,…,T) with l lags (l=1,…,L) and x 𝑡  a 
set of M exogenous variables, common to all units, the PVAR model is written as:  
 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖1,𝑡
1 𝑦1,𝑡−1+. . . +𝐴𝑖1,𝑡
𝐿 𝑦1,𝑡−𝐿 
       +𝐴𝑖2,𝑡
1 𝑦2,𝑡−1+. . . +𝐴𝑖2,𝑡
𝐿 𝑦2,𝑡−𝐿+. .. 
       +𝐴𝑖𝑁,𝑡
1 𝑦𝑁,𝑡−1+. . . +𝐴𝑖𝑁,𝑡
𝐿 𝑦𝑁,𝑡−𝐿 + 𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑙  are G*G matrices, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is a G*M matrix and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 are the uncorrelated over-time errors 
distributed as N(0, 𝛴𝑖𝑖,𝑡) with 𝛴𝑖𝑖,𝑡  the variance-covariance matrix. The model can be re-written 
in analytical form as:  
 
 (
𝑦1,𝑡
𝑦2,𝑡
⋮
𝑦𝑁,𝑡
) =
(
 
 
𝐴11,𝑡
1 𝐴12,𝑡
1 ⋯ 𝐴1𝑁,𝑡
1
𝐴21,𝑡
1 𝐴22,𝑡
1 ⋯ 𝐴2𝑁,𝑡
1
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐴𝑁1,𝑡
1 𝐴𝑁2,𝑡
1 ⋯ 𝐴𝑁𝑁,𝑡
1
)
 
 
(
𝑦1,𝑡−1
𝑦2,𝑡−1
⋮
𝑦𝑁,𝑡−1
)+. .. 
              +
(
 
 
𝐴11,𝑡
𝐿 𝐴12,𝑡
𝐿 ⋯ 𝐴1𝑁,𝑡
𝐿
𝐴21,𝑡
𝐿 𝐴22,𝑡
𝐿 ⋯ 𝐴2𝑁,𝑡
𝐿
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐴𝑁1,𝑡
𝐿 𝐴𝑁2,𝑡
𝐿 ⋯ 𝐴𝑁𝑁,𝑡
𝐿
)
 
 
(
𝑦1,𝑡−𝐿
𝑦2,𝑡−𝐿
⋮
𝑦𝑁,𝑡−𝐿
) + (
𝐶1,𝑡
𝐶2,𝑡
⋮
𝐶𝑁,𝑡
)𝑥𝑡 + (
𝑒1,𝑡
𝑒2,𝑡
⋮
𝑒𝑁,𝑡
), (2) 
 
with 𝑒𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0, Σ𝑖𝑖,𝑡) and Σ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 = (
Σ11,𝑡 Σ12,𝑡 ⋯ Σ1𝑁,𝑡
Σ21,𝑡 Σ22,𝑡 ⋯ Σ2𝑁,𝑡
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
Σ𝑁1,𝑡 Σ𝑁2,𝑡 ⋯ Σ𝑁𝑁,𝑡
), 
 
where y 𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of endogenous variables, x 𝑡  contains the exogenous variables and e 𝑖,𝑡 
are the error terms. 
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The unrestricted PVAR specification suffers from over-parameterization; this is 
because even a small PVAR is characterised by high parameter-space dimensionality.1 
Overcoming this problem requires the imposition of structural restrictions. We focus on four 
groups of restrictions; i) cross-sectional heterogeneities, ii) dynamic interdependencies, iii) 
static interdependencies and iv) dynamic heterogeneities. In the present context, it would be 
unrealistic to assume the homogeneity of the examined economies. Therefore, we allow for 
cross-sectional heterogeneities, i.e., 𝐴𝑖𝑘 ,𝑡
𝑙 ≠ 𝐴𝑗𝑘,𝑡
𝑙  and Σ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 ≠ Σ𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡 when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. In addition, since 
we are interested in capturing all the potential cross-sectional linkages among the examined 
economies, we assume that our system is characterised by dynamic interdependencies. Thus, 
the endogenous variables of each country depend on the lags of the endogenous variables of 
every other country. Using the above notation, this is equivalent to 𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑙 ≠ 0 when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
Furthermore, given the close economic ties among NAFTA members, we also allow for static 
interdependencies. Mathematically, Σ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ≠ 0 when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Therefore, we let a shock in one 
country be transmitted to another country. Finally, given the relative short time-span, it seems 
reasonable to assume dynamic homogeneity (homoscedasticity). These are the only type of 
restrictions that we impose in our model, i.e., 𝐴𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑙 = 𝐴𝑖𝑗 ,𝑠
𝑙  and Σ𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = Σ𝑖𝑗 ,𝑠, when 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠. The 
advantage of our PVAR specification is that allows for dynamic interactions among economies. 
In this way, our model differs from single VARs that are estimated using either data from one 
country or panel data (pooled estimates). Our model is estimated using the BEAR toolbox 
developed by Dieppe et al. (2016). 
We use annual data for the period 1950 – 2011 for the three members of the NAFTA 
trade bloc (Canada, Mexico and the US).2 The endogenous variables used in the analysis consist 
of: i) historical trade integration index (HTI), ii) real GDP (GDP), iii) consumption (CON) and 
iv) investment (INV).3 As an exogenous variable we use the spot crude oil price (OIL) as a 
proxy for supply side effects. The selection of macroeconomic variables is based on Schmitt-
                                                        
1 In the unrestricted version of our relatively small PVAR, with 𝐺 = 4, 𝑁 = 3, 𝑀 = 1 and 𝐿 = 1, 225 model 
parameters and 120 error variances and covariances should be estimated. 
2 2011 is the last available observation of the HTI index. 
3 Following the work of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2018), we express all macroeconomic variables as log-deviations 
from the trend. 
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Grohe and Uribe (2018) and collected from the IMF-IFS database, while the oil price is from 
the FRED database. The HTI index is based on the work of Standaert et al. (2015). The main 
advantage is its bilateral nature, where HTI  𝑖  → 𝑗 identifies country i as the exporter to country 
j, where HTI 𝑖  → 𝑗 ≠ HTI 𝑗  → 𝑖. In this way, we have six different sub-indexes; HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁  → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 , 
HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋  → 𝐶𝐴𝑁, HTI 𝑈𝑆  → 𝐶𝐴𝑁, HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁  → 𝑈𝑆 , HTI 𝑈𝑆  →  𝑀𝐸𝑋  and HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋  → 𝑈𝑆. Each of these 
indexes proxies the level of trade integration between the two countries. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of the bilateral HTI indexes for the NAFTA members over the period 1950 – 2011. 
The figure shows evidence of considerable heterogeneity in the trade integration across the 
NAFTA participants. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
We start the exposition of our results with reference to the GDP impulse responses presented 
in Figure 2. The left panel on the first row of Figure 2 plots the Canadian GDP response to a 
negative shock in HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁  → 𝑈𝑆 . The right panel on the first row presents the Canadian GDP 
response to a shock in HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁  → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 . In a similar vein, the second row shows the Mexican 
GDP response to a shock in HTI  𝑀𝐸𝑋  → 𝐶𝐴𝑁 (left panel) and a shock in HTI  𝑀𝐸𝑋  → 𝑈𝑆  (right 
panel). Finally, the third row shows the US response from shocks in HTI  𝑈𝑆  → 𝐶𝐴𝑁  and 
HTI 𝑈𝑆  → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 , respectively. 
 
Figure 2 here  
 
Findings from the left panel in Figure 2 suggest that Canadian and US activity is 
negatively affected, with the US experiencing the highest and the longest impact. Interestingly, 
our evidence suggests that both economies respond negatively on impact. This reflects the 
strong interconnection between the two economies. On the contrary, a shock in HTI  𝐶𝐴𝑁  → 𝑀𝐸𝑋  
and HTI 𝑈𝑆  → 𝑀𝐸𝑋  does not impact economic activity in Canada and the US in a statistically 
significant way. As far as Mexican economic activity is concerned (second row of Figure 2), 
our evidence reveals that Mexico is robust to a trade disintegration shock; both GDP responses 
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are statistically insignificant. One possible explanation is that Mexican exports could still be 
traded with US/Canada outside the NAFTA agreement, particularly those that support supply 
chains, or to alternative markets without significant increases in economic costs.4 
Figures 3-5, show the impulse responses of the remaining macroeconomic variables 
(CON and INV) for the three NAFTA members. The left panel of Figure 3 plots the responses 
of Canadian consumption and investment to a negative shock in HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁  → 𝑈𝑆 . The effects in 
both variables are negative and statistically significant. Investment initially decreases by 
0.02%, while consumption is reduced by slightly less. Even though the reduction is not large, 
the variables return to their pre-shock levels only after 4 years. The right panel of Figure 3 
shows the effect for the Canadian economy of a negative shock to HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁  → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 . Our evidence 
suggests that the Canadian economy responds negatively on impact. However, the effects are 
both economically and statistically insignificant. This asymmetric reaction of Canada reflects 
the primary role of the US economy. 
 
Figures 3-5  
 
Looking into the Mexican economy, the reaction to HTI shocks presents quite an 
interesting outcome. For the former case (the integration between Mexico and Canada), the left 
panel of Figure 4 shows that Mexican consumption and investment increase as result of a 
negative shock. However, this increase is statistically insignificant as the broad error bands 
depict. For the case of a HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋  → 𝑈𝑆  shock (right panel of Figure 4), the reaction is roughly 
zero. 
Turning to the US economy, our evidence reveals further asymmetries. A sudden 
negative shock to HTI 𝑈𝑆  → 𝐶𝐴𝑁  has a significant economic cost for the US, as it is depicted in 
the left panel of Figure 5. A 1% decrease in HTI causes a roughly 0.5% reduction in both 
consumption and investment. On the other hand, the US seems to be unaffected by a negative 
                                                        
4 Recent evidence suggests that the benefits to Mexico from the NAFTA deal are limited (Ramírez Sánchez et al., 
2018).  
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shock in HTI 𝑈𝑆  → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 . The responses presented in the right panel of Figure 5 show negative 
albeit insignificant reactions. 
Finally, we supplement our empirical results with a battery of tests, using alternative 
specifications, orderings and transformations of the variables in the PVAR model, to check the 
robustness of our main findings. As a first exercise, we estimate the implulse responses based 
on the PVAR model without the inclusion of the exogenous variable (OIL) in our specification. 
Our results and main conclusions remain almost identical. Additionally, we employ the PVAR 
model using alternative orderings of the endogenous variables and we find that the results 
remain robust. Lastly, we replicate the PVAR analysis using the logs of the endogenous 
variables (without using the series transformed in log-deviations from the trend) and our  main 
results remain unaltered.5 
Overall, our PVAR model reveals strong evidence of asymmetries among the three 
NAFTA members. The economy more susceptible to trade disintegration is found to be the US 
and, then, Canada. On the contrary, Mexico proves to be quite robust to a sudden trade shock. 
Moreover, the US and Canadian economies are found to be relatively more interconnected 
with each other rather than with the Mexican economy. Our results reaffirm the recent 
evidence of Weisbrot et al. (2014) and Ramírez Sánchez et al. (2018), while we call into question 
the earlier findings on the effects of NAFTA by Krueger (1999) and Burfisher et al. (2001). 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present paper is the first study that explores trade disintegration shocks within a PVAR 
framework. The current interest in the NAFTA integration scheme, and its potential 
disintegration in particular, provides an ideal setting to illustrate the usefulness of this 
methodology. The PVAR framework allows us to assess and test the potential linkages and 
spillovers among the NAFTA economies when faced with an unexpected shock. Moreover, the 
                                                        
5 These results can be provided upon request. 
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recent trend of sudden trade disintegration shocks, provides a number of other settings where 
this methodology could be applied in future.  
By taking into account cross-country heterogeneity, we are able to identify asymmetric 
macroeconomic responses to trade disintegration among the three NAFTA participants. The 
US is found to have the highest losses, while Mexico the least. Canada has already started to 
diversify its export markets by signing new trade deals (for example, the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) with the Pacific Rim countries), which are likely to further mitigate the 
negative effects of a potential collapse of NAFTA. In terms of Mexico, they would experience 
non-tariff barrier reductions (for example, by avoiding the NAFTA Rules of Origin) by trading 
under World Trade Organisation rules, which would go some way to mitigate the associated 
tariff increases. On the other hand, US consumers would experience higher prices due to 
increases in trade costs, where there is also the potential for additional US welfare loss due to 
any retaliation from Mexico and Canada. Overall, our findings suggest that a sudden 
unexpected negative shock on the integration of the NAFTA block damages the US.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Bilateral trade integration index (HTI) for the three NAFTA members (1950 
– 2011). 
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of the Canadian, Mexican and US real GDP (GDP) to a 
negative shock to the bilateral trade integration index (HTI).  
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of the Canadian consumption (CON) and investment 
(INV) to a negative shock to the bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between 
Canada-US and Canada-Mexico.   
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of the Mexican consumption (CON) and investment (INV) 
to a negative shock to the bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between Mexico-
Canada and Mexico-US.   
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of the US consumption (CON) and investment (INV) to a 
negative shock to the bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between US-Canada and 
US-Mexico. 
  
 
 
